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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged David John Harper with trafficking in marijuana.  Mr. Harper filed a
motion  to  suppress  the  statements  and  evidence  obtained  as  a  result  of  his  traffic  stop,  on  the
basis that I.C. § 49-638(1), the statute used to justify reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop,
was unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.  The district court denied the motion to
suppress.  The matter proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found Mr. Harper guilty.  The
district court imposed a unified sentence of three years fixed.  Mr. Harper appealed, asserting the
district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
In  its  Respondent’s  Brief,  the  State  argues  the  district  court  did  not  err  when it  denied
Mr. Harper’s motion to suppress, because section 49-638(1) is not unconstitutionally vague.
(See Resp. Br., pp.5-15.)  The State also argues that, even if section 49-638(1) is
unconstitutionally vague, suppression is not warranted under United States Supreme Court
precedent imposing a good faith exception for an officer’s acts performed pursuant to a statute
later declared unconstitutionally vague.  (See Resp. Br., pp.15-17.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s good faith exception argument.
Mr. Harper submits that, under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, there is no good faith
exception for an officer’s acts performed pursuant to a statute later declared
unconstitutionally vague.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Harper’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
2ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Harper’s motion to suppress?
3ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Harper’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
Mr. Harper asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because
I.C. § 49-638(1) is void for vagueness as applied to his conduct.  Because section 49-638(1), the
statute used to justify Mr. Harper’s traffic stop, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his
conduct, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that his car was being driven contrary
to traffic laws.  The traffic stop therefore violated Mr. Harper’s constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.  The district court should have suppressed the
statements and evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.
B. Idaho Code § 49-638(1) Is Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To Mr. Harper’s
Conduct
Mr. Harper asserts I.C. § 49-638(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.
He asserts section 49-638(1) failed to provide fair notice that his conduct was proscribed.  Even
if section 49-638(1) provided fair notice that his conduct was proscribed, Mr. Harper asserts the
statute failed to provide sufficient guidelines, such that the police had unbridled discretion in
determining whether to seize him.
The State argues Mr. Harper has not shown section 49-638(1) is unconstitutionally vague.
(Resp. Br., p.8.)  The State contends Mr. Harper has not established section 49-638(1) failed to
give him adequate notice his behavior was prohibited, because, “[a]s other jurisdictions have
repeatedly found, a reasonably intelligent individual could form some idea of what it means to
follow another vehicle more closely than is ‘reasonable and prudent.’”  (Resp. Br., p.12.)  The
State argues section 49-638(1) “also provides sufficient guidelines for law enforcement.”  (Resp.
4Br., p.12.)  Because the State’s argument on whether section 49-638(1) is unconstitutionally
vague is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary.  Accordingly, Mr. Harper refers the Court
to pages 7-14 of the Appellant’s Brief.
C. Under Article I, § 17 Of The Idaho Constitution, There Is No Good Faith Exception For
An  Officer’s  Acts  Performed  Pursuant  To  A  Statute  Later  Declared  Unconstitutionally
Vague
In reply to the State’s good faith exception argument, Mr. Harper submits that, under
Article  I,  §  17  of  the  Idaho  Constitution,  there  is  no  good faith  exception  for  an  officer’s  acts
performed pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutionally vague.
The State argues that even if this Court determines that section 49-638(1) is
constitutionally vague, “suppression is not required.”  (Resp. Br., p.15.)  The State recognizes
that, “[b]ecause the district court determined the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, this
argument  was  not  raised  before  the  district  court.”   (Resp.  Br.,  p.15.)   The  State  contends  this
Court “should still affirm the district court’s order denying suppression based upon the ‘right
result-wrong theory’ rule.”  (Resp. Br., p.15.)
The State then argues that, “[u]nder United States Supreme Court precedent, a
constitutionally valid seizure is not rendered invalid by a subsequent determination that the law
on which the seizure was based is unconstitutionally vague.”  (Resp. Br., p.16 (citing
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 431 U.S. 31, 37-40 (1979); United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120,
1125 (7th Cir. 1999).)  The United States Supreme Court in DeFillippo held, “[t]he subsequently
determined invalidity of the Detroit ordinance on vagueness grounds does not undermine the
validity  of  the  arrest  made  for  violation  of  that  ordinance,  and  the  evidence  discovered  in  the
search of respondent should not have been suppressed.” DeFillippo, 431 U.S. at 40.  The Idaho
Court of Appeals has characterized DeFillippo as “imposing a good faith exception for an
5officer’s acts performed pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutionally vague.” State v.
Pettit, Nos. 44198 & 44199, ___ P.3d ___, 2017 WL 4321108, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 29,
2017).
The State “acknowledges the Idaho Court of Appeals’ recent decision in State v. Pettit,
Docket Nos. 44198/44199 (Idaho App. Sept. 29, 2017) (petition for review pending), questioned
the applicability of DeFillippo under the Idaho Constitution.”1  (Resp. Br., p.17.)  In Pettit, the
State argued on appeal that the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate’s order
granting the respondent’s motion to suppress. Pettit, 2017 WL 4321108, at *2.  The Court of
Appeals held the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the respondent’s car,
and also held the officer made an objectively reasonable mistake of law. Id. at *2-4.
The Pettit Court then turned to the issue of “whether an objectively reasonable mistake of
law amounts to a good faith exception to Idaho’s independent exclusionary rule, so that here,
suppression would be inappropriate.” Id. at *4.  The Court of Appeals emphasized that, pursuant
to Idaho Supreme Court precedent, a good faith exception was not allowed under Article I, §17
of the Idaho Constitution. Id. (citing State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012); State v. Guzman, 122
Idaho 981 (1992)). The State argued, inter alia, “that not creating a good faith exception is
inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in [DeFillippo].” Id.  The Pettit
Court decided DeFillippo had “no bearing on whether Idaho’s independent exclusionary rule is
operable, allowing courts to suppress evidence even as to a reasonable mistake of law.” Id.  The
Court of Appeals declined to follow DeFillippo “and adopt a good faith exception for an
officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law.” Id.  Thus, the Pettit Court affirmed the district
court’s ruling suppressing the evidence. Id.
6Here,  the  State  argues  that,  while  Mr.  Harper  “provided  a  cursory  citation  to  the  Idaho
Constitution on appeal and before the district court,” his argument “is based upon the United
States Supreme Court decision in Kolender and  [the]  United  States  Constitution,  and  thus
DeFillippo is still controlling.”  (Resp. Br., p.17.)  However, the State has recognized its
argument based on DeFillippo, that suppression is not warranted even if section 49-638(1) is
unconstitutionally vague, was not raised before the district court.  (See Resp.  Br.,  p.15.)   The
State also recognizes that Mr. Harper invoked Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, before
the district court and on appeal.  (See Resp. Br., p.17 (citing R., p.37; App. Br., p.8).)
Thus,  in  light  of  the  above,  Mr.  Harper  submits  that,  under  Article  I,  §  17  of  the  Idaho
Constitution, there is no good faith exception for an officer’s acts performed pursuant to a statute
later declared unconstitutionally vague. See Pettit, 2017 WL 4321108, at *4.
CONCLUSION
For  the  above  reasons,  as  well  as  the  reasons  contained  in  the  Appellant’s  Brief,
Mr. Harper respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment and
commitment, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand the case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of December, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
1 The Idaho Supreme Court’s Clerk Office has indicated to undersigned counsel that the Petition
for Review in Pettit was denied on December 14, 2017.
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